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For some time now, the research team for “Cognitive Enrichment and Special Educational Needs” 
of the University of Seville (Spain) has been working on the study of thinking skills and their 
assessment and improvement (e.g. Aguilera, 1989, 1991, 1997; Aguilera & Mora, 1992,1993; 
Lera & Aguilera, 1992; Mora, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1998; Mora & Aguilera, 1992; Mora & Mora-
Merchán, 1995). The work we hereby present is part of this line of research and has as a main 
objective the validation of an instrument for the assessment of thinking skills necessary for 
cognitive functioning and social adjustment. 
 
Other authors (e.g. Imbernón, 1999, ERT, 1995) and ourselves (Aguilera, 2000b; Aguilera and 
García, 2000) have analysed the demands the information society places on the educational 
system and the contributions that have been made both in the contexts of educational and social 
intervention (for the first, see for example, Drucker, 1993; Minc, 1994; Toffler, 1980,1990; 
Cabrerizo, 1986; European Commision, 1994; Castells, 1995; and for the second, Tedesco, 1995; 
Pérez, 1996; Delors, 1996). We have also commented on how the present educational system in 
Spain (MEC, 1990) incorporates elements that intend to contribute to the education of future 
generations following present demands. The inclusion of procedural educational contents and the 
explicit formulation, as an educational principle, of the need for students to “learn to learn”  and 
to “learn to think” are thus, in this sense, an interesting novelty. 
 
If education in an information society had to be resumed under two coordinates, without doubt 
they should be those of the need to develop adequate thinking skills, specially the ability to take 
part in teamwork, and the development of certain attitudes and values. In this article we will centre 
on the first of these aspects in what has been called shared thinking or thinking in interaction 
(Aguilera, 1997, 2000a): we are considering thought not just as any form of response to reality, 
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but specifically as a cultural (i.e. a shared) response to it. 
 
In the following pages we shall comment on the thinking skills that centre our interest, why they 
should be studied during interaction and the usefulness of their assessment. As we comment on 
our empirical work we shall present the instrument designed for the assessment of this form of 
cognition, the PAT (Procedure for the Assessment of Thinking in Interaction) (Aguilera, 2000a), 
and some results and conclusions obtained from its use in two studies, one longitudinal and 
another cross-sectional. 
 
The thinking skills we are interested in 
We are interested in the human being as a subject that processes information, and that thinks as 
he or she does so. One particularly human aspect specially interests us: the fact that thought itself 
can be the object of thinking. This is a level of processing superior to that of analysing data, texts, 
knowledge or even than intelligence (information capable of creating new information from that 
which already exists) (Aguilera, 1997, 2000b; Gago, 1995). We are referring to the metacognitive 
level: thinking that can perceive itself, thus leading to the appearance of social realities 
(heteroregulation), the possibility of self-regulation and the capability of comprehension and 
transformation, both of the environment and of the self. We are not so much interested in 
intelligence in itself, as much as the profit that can be obtained from it through adequate use of 
certain strategies, procedures and thinking skills. Intelligence is capable of solving problems, 
thinking creates them, invents them; intelligence is an aptitude (a potentiality), thinking is an act. 
 
If we must respond to social demands in the information society, the thinking skills in which we 
should centre are those that allow us to learn to learn, that is, those that allow a person to perceive 
his or herself developing possibilities of self-regulation, self-comprehension and self-
transformation in a certain context at the same time as he or she is capable of comprehending 
and transforming it. This is why we are interested in the thinking skills necessary to handle internal 
and external information in a manner that is adapted to the environment. We also believe that the 
cognitive tools necessary to understand and change the conditions of living, the day-to-day 
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situations, and to adapt to them should be taught, and in this we find another reason to be 
interested in them. 
 
The thinking skills we are focusing on are therefore those that are useful in the solution of daily 
problems, within our own social context. We are not attempting to reduce the importance of skills 
needed to undertake specific tasks in the school setting, but to go further in identifying general 
abilities not necessarily linked to academic content and useful in highly ecological situations. 
 
This way of conceiving thought has proven to be valid in intervention. Results obtained with the 
programme “Comprehending and Transforming” (Mora, 1991,1998) centred on self-regulation 
skills seem to confirm it. The skills were identified by external observers when they described 
what they thought were indicators of high level intellectual functioning, of improved cognition 
(using the expression of Nickerson, Perkins and Smith, 1987) that are not usually appreciated in 
standardized instruments,  such as intelligence tests, which are usually employed to evaluate 
cognitive enrichment programmes. For this work we have used a group of thinking skills that 
respond to these characteristics and that have their roots in two different but, so we believe, 
converging conceptual and research traditions: metacognition and critical thinking. 
 
In Contexts of Interaction 
We are, in addition, interested in these thinking skills when they come into being in contexts of 
interaction, that is, when teams of people are facing problem solving. We understand thought not 
only as a response to reality, but as a collective, shared, cultural, response of human groups to 
the context’s demands. It is not just “thinking about events and objects”, but also “with others”, or 
even “with myself” in a self-referring situation. We already pointed out above that our focus of 
interest is not on intelligence, but on what can be obtained from it. Now we can add that we are 
even less interested in intelligence understood as and individual asset. In any case we would be 
referring to what authors such as Costa and Lowery (1989) or Legree (1995) have called social 
intelligence, although expressions such as “shared thinking” or “thinking in interaction” seem more 
adequate. The former social “intelligence” is also used to name individual abilities for the solution 
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of interpersonal problem solving. 
There are reasons to be interested in interpersonal interactions. In the first place, the problems 
we must face in a complicated society require the handling of a great deal of information, so 
complex that it would be very difficult for an individual alone to handle all the resources necessary 
to solve them without cooperation with others. Also, as Vygotsky (1979), Wertsch (1988) and 
Rogoff (1993), among others, have defended, the capability to think develops in a social milieu. 
It is social interaction that makes a person develop forms of reasoning adequate for their 
transforming adaptation to their environment. Different forms of social interaction, in diverse 
cultural contexts, will have different effects on development. Instead of the piagetian metaphor of 
the child scientist, Rogoff (1993) proposes the child apprentice, who learns while participating in 
problem solving tasks with the help of others with greater expertise. In her work, Rogoff assumes 
that human development is of a social nature and she emphasises the role of context as a unit of 
analysis, while rejecting any individual psychological phenomenon considered separately from its 
social context. In the second place, social interactions are a fundamental element in school 
learning models of undoubted interest, such as dialogic learning (Flecha, 1997,1999; Flecha and 
Tortajada, 1999). Finally, we believe there is no sense in stating that thinking is cultural and is 
construed in interaction and then proceeding to assess it individually. Concepts such as the zone 
of proximal development do not refer to individual aspects, but to a space that appears during 
interaction, a shared space of common cognition that is more that the addition of individual 
thinking. 
 
The following are elements of the shared nature of thinking skills we are specifically interested in: 
intersubjectivity, interrelation between the actual (present) and that which is possible (future), the 
notions of appropriation, zone of proximal development, negotiation of meanings, scaffolding, 
situation definition, shared thinking, sociocognitive conflict, etc. 
 
Neopiagetian research about the development of the formation of conscience and processes of 
regulation has also pointed out that social interaction situations are essential (e.g. Mugny and 
Doise, 1983; Perret-Clermont, 1984; Mugny, Paolis and Carugati, 1991; Perret-Clermont, Perret 
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and Bell, 1991). However, both these studies and those carried out within a Vygotskian framework 
have limited themselves to situations of sociocognitive conflict, either in dyadic or in asymmetric 
situations. We shall do so in situations that require collaboration among equals in teams of 
subjects similar to those formed in classrooms for cooperative work or in groups of friends. Our 
focus is on the cooperative work and social interaction in teams of school-age children that face 
problem solving together. 
 
We know that not all thinking fits in the conceptualisation we are defending. The analysis of 
individual processes should probably continue to be a priority. But we do believe that the 
assessment of thinking skills is incomplete if individuals are not observed in interaction with others 
with higher, lower or equal cognitive level. On the other hand, the study of thinking skills in dyadic 
situations is complicated enough methodologically to discourage further broadening of the field. 
However, the risks of studying interaction among equals must be undertaken. It is easy to say so, 
of course, as a general recommendation, but this must also be done with specific situations and 
instruments that make it concrete and possible to evaluate. We are not sure whether to enter into 
such matters, and are conscious of the ease with which mistakes can be made when talking about 
social situations and thought separated from intelligence. However, the studies undertaken up to 
present in our research group encourage us to do so.  
 
Assessment 
We have just pointed out the our maximum interest is in the analysis of thinking processes and 
abilities that are activated in social problem solving in interaction (which is also social). The main 
point of departure is that maximum interest of the teaching of cognitive tools is the enrichment of 
thinking abilities that are applied to everyday (although not necessarily of the immediate context) 
problem solving, nearly always saturated of social factors. We can, however, ask ourselves the 
reason for this task we call assessment, why we claim our purpose to be the objective analysis of 
this form of thinking in order to evaluate it. The answer lies in the consideration that the teaching 
of thinking requires, among other things, the knowledge of the development of these abilities both 
in the normal and the less stimulated population. Both one and the other seem to be lacking in 
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current literature (Forns, 1993). 
 
Most of the intervention programmes are evaluated using individual paper-and-pencil tasks 
(normally IQ tests), more centred on products than on thinking processes, and analysing expected 
effects, when unexpected ones are just as interesting or more. These procedures are, in addition, 
complicated for teachers to use in the assessment of present curricula. 
 
In our own revision of the methods for the assessment of metacognitive and critical thinking skills 
(Aguilera, 1997), we have found that most instruments are inadequate for the evaluation of 
thinking skills in interaction. The critical thinking assessment procedures consist of individual 
written tasks, although they can be used as a pretext for team discussions. We believe, however, 
that ecological validity is best guaranteed with problems close to subjects’ daily experiences. The 
metacognitive assessment instruments are also designed for individual application. 
 
The assessment procedure we have adopted, as will be seen below, relies on observation. In this 
way we have access to spontaneous, direct information, present while subjects face the task, and 
under different modalities, such as verbal expressions (elaborated and semi-construed –
expressions of developing thoughts), gestures or “eloquent” silences, and with different contents 
(communicative, or regulatory of self or other behaviour).  
 
As we mentioned above, the objective is to determine the validity of an instrument for the 
assessment of shared thinking, the “Procedure for the Assessment of Thinking in Interaction” 
(PAT) (Aguilera, 2000a) in two studies, one cross-sectional and another longitudinal. 
 
Method 
Subjects 
PAT has been used in our research, in a longitudinal and a cross-sectional study. In the first, data 
from subjects were taken on two occasions separated by a 26-month interval, and in the second, 
on one only occasion, data from three different age groups. 
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The sample for the longitudinal study was composed of 30 groups of six elementary and middle 
school students randomly chosen from their classes. Groups were selected in order to include 
two levels of social and cultural stimulation. Fifteen groups attended schools socially deprived 
zones and the other 15 from residential areas, all of them living in the city of Seville. The sample 
was also distributed among three age levels: Primary 2, Primary 5 and Primary 8. 
 
The sample for the cross-sectional study was composed of six groups similar those of the other, 
with ages corresponding to Primary 4 and Primary 6. 
 
Instruments 
A procedure named PAT was developed for use in developmental research, the field of learning 
disabilities, the determination of special needs and the evaluation of cognitive intervention 
programmes, as well as the in the evaluation of procedural contents included in the Kindergarten, 
Primary and Secondary curricula.  
 
It is composed of an assessment procedure and an observation instrument. The first consists of 
a series of problems each team of students must solve. There are nine problems of three different 
types, complexity and difficulty. Problems relative to institutional conflicts, interpersonal situations 
and logic puzzles were included. They were presented to each team, and student conversation 
video recorded and analysed. Table 1 shows an example of each of these situations. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The observation instrument used for video analysis consists of a group of “improved cognition 
indicators”, i.e., general cognitive abilities to be assessed. Some correspond to metacognitive 
abilities, others to critical thinking skills, information management skills, and problem-solving and 
reasoning skills (see table 2) 
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INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Procedure 
Procedure was similar in both studies. Teams were randomly formed and selected: in each class 
students were randomly assigned to groups, and then three teams were randomly chosen in each 
one of them. The field protocol explicitly indicated that no pupil that did not want to participate 
should be included. The same document included instructions to be presented to the teams. 
These were taken out of the classrooms, one at a time in a predetermined order. They were taken 
to another hall prepared with a video camera, taking note of identification data of the teams and 
each of the students. Corresponding problems were then presented and children were allowed to 
discuss them. Adults in charge would then distance themselves from the group, without leaving 
the room. Each team had to solve a logic problem (type C1 from table 1), an interpersonal problem 
(type B2 from table 1) and an institutional problem (type A1 from table 1) in the longitudinal study. 
In the cross-sectional study only the institutional type problem was presented. In the longitudinal 
study, the situations assigned to each team was done in such a way that all them solved every 
situation, and that each team would not face the same problem in any of the two moments. Tasks 
were considered completed when the pupils said they had finished, when the situation had 
deteriorated to a point in which they were abandoning the task, or after a maximum period of 60 
minutes. Once data collection was completed, recordings were coded for presence or absence of 
the cognition indicators in each minute. 
 
Raven Progressive Matrices were used as an external indicator. This test was passed to all the 
class before the problems were presented to the teams. Academic performance indicators were 
also obtained. 
 
Results 
Cross-sectional study 
  
9 
Reliability was determined contrasting the coding of two experimented observers1. No significant 
differences were found in the coding, or in the instructions to each team or their gender 
composition. 
No statistical differences in average time devoted to discussion of problems were found for same 
age groups among different stimulation levels. All second, fifth and eight year teams tended to 
spend similar times discussing the problems, irrespective of their socioeconomic status. 
Discussion time, however, does increase significantly with age: 2’5” is the average for second 
year pupils, 6’11” for fifth and 12’14” for eighth.  
 
Data relative to frequency of thinking abilities indicators followed a similar pattern. There were no 
significant differences among scores obtained by teams of the same age level, average scores 
increased with age, and differences between deprived and stimulated subjects, although slightly 
favourable to these, were not significant (see figure 1). However, if items relative to metacognitive 
abilities are considered separately, differences between stimulated and deprived subjects, in the 
13 and 14 year old level, were significant (see figure 2). Other reasoning abilities appeared in the 
three age groups considered and increased with age. Metacognitive abilities only appeared 
clearly in the 13 and over group, especially in the stimulated teams.  
 
INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 
 
In third place, a qualitative evaluation of three aspects (discussion process, decision-making and 
metacognitive control) was carried out. 
 
The discussion process was different in the three age levels. Second year students began to talk 
immediately, did not express discrepant opinions or argued and seemed to be preoccupied with 
finding an answer quickly, in such a manner that when a group member proposed a solution it 
was immediately adopted by the team. Fifth year students also began to talk rapidly, although in 
                                            
1 The author of this article and Dr. Mora, to whom we express our gratitude. 
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some cases certain group members did not participate and devoted themselves to rereading the 
instructions. In some teams (not all of them), there are discrepant opinions, with no differences 
among SES levels. They are very interested in finding a solution (in a similar way to the second 
year groups), but every member seemed to have his/her own and opposed all others without 
giving them any consideration. Older students commenced in a similar fashion to the fifth year 
subjects (rapid in some cases, rereading in others). Alternative solutions did appear and there 
was a discussion that in certain moments consisted in considering pros and cons of other 
solutions. The main concern was still the final response (the product) and social consideration 
(receiving group approval). Sometimes contributions were valued and in others there were no 
replicas, depending on the prestige of the person forwarding the proposal. The discussion was 
ordered, with an appropriate turn taking. 
 
The younger children reached decisions without examining the problem and often the conclusion 
had been reached while the examiner was explaining the situation. The group decision was the 
first presented. It was thus a quick decision, but in a way that could be considered very particular 
since it had not been negotiated. It was more a gregarious ascription to whatever was first said 
than a real agreement, with a certain social pressure against diverging opinions. Fifth year 
students arrived at their conclusions in a manner that was similar to their second year 
counterparts or through voting. Decisions were also reached here in the first moments. Reasons 
for adopting a certain conclusion were of diverse nature: the decision of a leader that was not 
discussed (since this was considered opposition), the first opinion offered, or the contribution that 
had been discussed most. With eighth graders the final decision was taken in agreement with 
others. What determined a certain selection was the imposition of one member, a backing by the 
leader, persistence and conviction shown during argumentation and in some cases the analysis 
of pros and cons. 
 
Metacognitive control was the third aspect analysed from a qualitative point of view. Second year 
students maintained attention during the period of discussion, although this was of a fairly short 
duration, there was no control of impulsivity or self-regulation routines (planning, supervision or 
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review). They even forgot some of the demands of the task, which were left without response. 
Fifth graders displayed medium and low maintenance of attention (the longer they took to solve 
the task, the lower the attention). Certain impulsivity control and slight indices of self-regulation 
did appear, although they never included review of task solution once it was completed. Finally, 
attention and impulsivity control in eighth grade pupils was high. Automatic (not explicitly 
formulated) self-regulation routines appeared, contributing to a more structured activity. 
 
Results of the longitudinal study 
A random sample representative of the different duration video recordings (6/36) was analysed 
for reliability by different observers, all of them trained psychologists2. Average interobserver 
agreement was 90%, with a range of 86 to 99% by sessions and 72 to 100% by indicators. Three 
variables in which reliability was below 80% were reanalysed, and one of them was finally 
discarded with a reliability of 72%. With these data it can be concluded that PAT has adequate 
reliability. 
 
In order to determine the developmental level of different groups, four indicators were used: 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices test, academic performance, PAT scores and discussion time in 
PAT situations. Results show that although there is a certain variation among teams, they do not 
differ significantly in academic performance or on the test of Progressive Matrices. They do not 
differ, either, on the PAT scores and discussion time. This is true both when data is considered 
globally and for each of the 23 improved cognition indicators, on the one hand, and when 
considering each of the nine situations independently, each of the three type of situations or all 
together. Differences did not appear in either moment (1 or 2).  
 
All three types of situations and the nine situations were compared. It must be remembered that 
we had designed three kinds of tasks, each of which was composed of three different problems. 
Were these types really different among each other? Were the three problems of each kind really 
                                            
2 I would like to thank Isabel García and Joaquín Mora-Merchán for their assistance in this point. 
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equivalent? Two reference indicators were taken to respond to this question: PAT scores and 
time of discussion. Results show that both variables are significantly different when considered 
among types, but not when situations of the same kind are compared (see table and figure 3). 
These results indicate that the three types of problems are really different and that those within 
each category are equivalent.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 AND FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
Another issue relates to  PAT’s sensitivity to developmental changes between moments 1 and 
2. Indicators in this case were once again discussion times in PAT situations and improved 
cognition indicators on PAT. 
 
Results relative to discussion time show overall sample significant differences both in when 
situation types were considered jointly and separately. The differences between moments 1 and 
2 were similar among the three situation types and the nine problems (see table and figure 4). 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 AND FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
Significant overall sample differences were found between moments 1 and 2 in PAT indicators, 
both considering situations jointly and by category. These differences are similar among situation 
types and particular problems (see table and figure 5). We can thus point out that the results of 
the cross-sectional study relative to developmental sensitivity of PAT are confirmed here.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 AND FIGURE 5 HERE 
 
Finally, comparison among scores in each of the improved cognition indicators between moments 
1 and 2 was carried out. We asked ourselves whether developmental change differed among 
thinking skills. Results show that although scores increase in all indicators, increments are not 
always significant (see figure and table 6). 
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INSERT TABLE 6 AND FIGURE 6 HERE 
 
Discussion 
Both the longitudinal and the cross-sectional studies indicate that the reliability  of PAT is 
adequate, when adequate observer training is guaranteed. We do believe, however, that this 
aspect could be improved increasing category definition precision in those points that registered 
slight discrepancies, e.g., enriching definitions with examples. In order for its use to be 
generalised, training procedures should aspects relative both to observational methodology in 
general and to adequate interpretation of improved cognition indicators in particular. 
 
Secondly, the design of three types of  situations, each one composed of three equivalent 
problems, was confirmed by statistical analyses, with significant differences, both in discussion 
times and PAT scores among problem types, and non-significant differences within problem 
categories. 
 
It is a useful instrument to assess thinking skills in interaction situations that informs of dialogue 
characteristics in logic, interpersonal and institutional problems in compulsory education subjects 
of different ages. In this sense: 
 
a) It is sensitive to developmental changes in problem solving skills in 
interaction. With PAT we have identified some developmental patterns of 
problem solving, that could serve as a basis for further studies. This is true 
both for discussion time and cognitive indictor scores. Metacognitive 
abilities appear later than other problem solving. They do not seem to be 
present before the age of thirteen or over. However, we have not intended 
to develop a standardisation of the level of shared cognition for the 
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different ages. This is therefore, a pending study. 
 
b) It is sensitive to differing levels of social and cultural stimulation. In the 
older age groups, metacognitive item scores differ significantly between 
high and low stimulation groups. These data are confirmed with the 
qualitative assessment: descriptions of 2nd and 5th grade groups are more 
similar among themselves than any of the 8th year ones. These 
dissimilarities are most evident in the metacognitive control groups. 
 
We can, based on these results, therefore claim that intervention for the 
improvement of metacognitive abilities must thus be possible, since in our 
sample they appear not only as a consequence of age but also of social 
and cultural stimulation. 
 
The use of this methodology, following the procedure already described, 
seems adequate for use in the assessment of thinking skills, both in 
educational and developmental research and in the design of educational 
curricula. 
 
Other data obtained with PAT supports the following conclusions: 
 
a) Both the time students take on solving a task and scores obtained are 
good indications of the level of cognitive development. Therefore, PAT is 
sensitive to developmental changes. Only in one team, composed of 
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students with learning disabilities, was this trend not appreciated. New 
studies would be needed to determine the applicability of PAT to this 
population. 
 
b) Data obtained with PAT tends to discriminate more among teams than 
academic performance or scores on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
test. High scores on one of these variables relates to high scores on the 
others, but differences among teams are greater on PAT, although 
interteam differences did not reach statistical significance due to the small 
size of the sample and the fact that they were specifically selected from 
equivalent age groups. Larger and more heterogeneous samples should 
be used to confirm these findings. 
 
c) An unexpected result was the improvement of Raven test scores between 
moments 1 and 2. Distortion due to small sample size is the only 
explanation we can find for this result. Cognitive enrichment produced by 
one of the teachers that had participated in thinking skills programme 
training was a possible hypothesis. However, it was discarded since no 
significant differences among groups in moment 2 were found. 
 
d) PAT scores and discussion times in logic problems were higher than those 
obtained with interpersonal and institutional problems. The explanation, 
we believe, is that in the logic problems there is immediate feedback on 
having obtained the correct solution. This would lead to students no being 
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satisfied with any answer, as happens in other problem types in which 
results depend only on the degree of complexity of students’ thinking. 
However, differences between one and another type of situations were not 
significant, so it could be concluded that progress experimented by each 
group does not depend on the kind of situation. 
 
e) Correlations of PAT scores and discussion times with Raven Progressive 
Matrices scores could discourage, for the sake of economy, the use of 
PAT. This could be so if all interest were centred on data relative to the 
products of intellectual functioning. But when we are interested in 
assessing processes and identifying specific thinking skills, we should 
define and observe them separately. Paper and pencil tests are not useful 
either when the thinking abilities we would like to assess are those that 
come into action in social interaction situations in cooperative teamwork. 
The correlations we have mentioned should thus be interpreted as a 
confirmation of the instrument’s validity, rather than as an argument in 
favour of its irrelevance. 
 
f) Finally, significant increments were not found in all ages in every PAT 
cognition score. These items could need improvement in their definition or 
simply be excluded from the instrument. However, this should not be 
attempted before discarding some possible explanatory hypotheses, such 
as an insufficient age span for differences to effectively appear, an 
insufficient social and cultural diversity in the sample, or the fact that some 
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of the cognitions evaluated do not appear thorough simple maturation, but 
need specific formal training for most children. Since research carried out 
by other members of our research group have found differences in these 
indicators among groups, it does not seem appropriate to exclude them 
without analysing more closely the reasons for a lack of replication of those 
results. 
 
Finally, research pending could be detailed in the following manner: a) is PAT 
susceptible of use in ordinary educational assessment? which educational 
objectives can be evaluated using this procedure and which cannot? what does 
assessment in shools with the instrument entail for teachers and for the 
procedure itself? b) PAT should be tested for use in the evaluation of cognitive 
enrichment programmes, and c) its application should be explored with samples 
of a different nature to those used here, such as students with special educational 
needs, different age groups, teams with a controlled heterogeneity in cognitive 
development, social and cultural stimulation, academic performance, previous 
experience with similar tasks, etc. 
 
As can be seen, what is left to explore is more than what has been achieved. 
More so if our contribution is compared to the context of social demands we 
commented on the beginning of this article. We do, however, hope to apply to 
ourselves what we stated before: all important tasks require the cooperative 
teamwork of closely knit groups. This is one of those tasks and we expect to 
continue with it in the research lines this study opens. We trust it will also stimulate 
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other teams that are involved in similar fields to share information of mutual 
interest. 
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a.1 
In the neighbourhood where you live there is a bit of wasteland in which lots of 
children normally play. For some time now the neighbours have been asking the 
City Council to build a park there. However, an insurance company has bought 
the land and is going to build a block of offices. Most of the people still want a 
park. 
 
What do you think could be done to get it? Discuss the problem until you 
reach an agreement about what should and could be done to get the park 
everyone wants.  
b.2. 
Albert is a boy that entered our class at the beginning of this year, when he 
failed and had to repeat the course. He never seems to understand anything 
and fails most of the exams. He is always distracted, playing with toys or talking 
with his classmate. Although everyone laughs a lot at what he does, he has not 
got many friends, because he is always fighting with the others and, besides, 
getting together with him is a sure way of failing in class. Teachers are 
wondering what to do with him: throw him out of school, leave him until he 
finishes, or... anything else that could be a solution. The other kids in class don’t 
seem to agree among themselves either about what to do. 
 
What do you think should be done? Think about it and discuss it with the 
others until you reach an agreement or you are convinced it is impossible 
to do so.  
c.1 
A train covers the long distance that separates two European cities in seven 
days. A train leaves daily from the first town to the second, and another does so 
in the opposite direction. Let’s suppose we catch the train. How many trains will 
we meet coming in the opposite direction? Some people on the train say it’s 
seven, but the train driver, that has done the journey more than once now, says 
it is a few more. 
 
Would you be able to say how many there will be? Think about it and 
discuss it until you reach an agreement or until you give up. 
 
Table 1.- Examples of the three types of problems found in the PAT. 
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01. Defining the problem spontaneously, explaining it more precisely and/or reformulating it. 
02. Analysing reality. Decomposing it in parts. 
03. Simplifying situations. Considering partial aspects as a solution strategy. 
04. Contributions of new, relevant and pertinent information. 
0.5 Argumentation, justification and/or reasoning opinions and decisions. 
06. Formulating conclusions based on given information. 
07. Formulating hypotheses as a point of departure for a line of reasoning. 
08. Pointing our absurdities or contradictions in an argumentation. 
09. Reformulating previously discussed points: reconsidering already closed aspects. 
10. Exploring alternatives. Opening new lines of discussion 
11. Non impulsive behaviour. Maintenance of a reflexive rhythm. 
12. Planning of action: Pointing out objectives, stages towards success... 
13. Applying earlier contributions to new situations. 
14. Centring on processes. Pointing out strategies and procedures. 
15. Revising, discussing, verifying own contributions. 
16. Maintaining attention to continue implication in task. 
17. Maintaining a critical and nonconformist cognitive attitude. 
18. Self-referring conclusions relative to attitudes, mistakes... 
19. Formulating general laws decontextualised and distanced relative to task. 
20. Demand of a greater amount of information. 
21. Precision in the demand and transmission of information. 
22. Inclusion of conclusions in wider and more abstract reference systems . 
23. Consideration of the point of view of others. Inclusion in an opinion of the contributions of 
others. Adopting the point of view of another person. 
 
Table 2.- Improved cognition indicators in the observation instrument of the PAT. 
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A/ PAT Scores 
 
AVERAGE 
 
SD 
 
F 
 
p 
 
INSTITUTIONAL 
PROBLEMS 
 
59,6667 
 
38,438 
 
16,3760** 
 
0,0099 
 
INTERPERSONAL 
PROBLEMS 
 
55,8333 
 
38,06 
 
LOGIC 
PROBLEMS 
 
146,6667 
 
67,263 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** p < 0,01 
 
 
B/ PAT dialogue time 
 
AVERAGE 
 
SD 
 
F 
 
p 
 
INSTITUTIONAL 
PROBLEMS 
 
18 
 
10,412 
 
15,5018* 
 
0,0161 
 
INTERPERSONAL 
PROBLEMS 
 
17,667 
 
11,237 
 
LOGIC 
PROBLEMS 
 
36,333 
 
11,776 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p < 0,05 
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MOMENT 1 
 
MOMENT 2
 
 
 
AVERAGE 
 
SD. 
 
AVERAGE
 
INSTITUTIONAL 
 
3,6667 
 
3,777
1 
 
14,333
 
INTERPERSONAL 
 
3 
 
1,673
3 
 
14,667
 
LOGIC 
 
10,5 
 
9,137
8 
 
25,833
 
TOTAL 
 
5,7222 
 
6,460
8 
 
18,278
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MOMENT 1 
 
MOMENT 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AVERAGE 
 
SD. 
 
AVERAGE 
 
SD. 
 
F 
 
p 
 
INSTITUTIONAL 
 
8,5 
 
11,432 
 
49,5 
 
30,507 
 
9,5025* 
 
0,0116 
 
INTERPERSONAL 
 
4,5 
 
0,8367 
 
50,5 
 
37,719 
 
8,9195* 
 
0,0137 
 
LOGIC 
 
30,833 
 
24,359 
 
106,1667 
 
68,142 
 
6,5023* 
 
0,0289 
 
TOTAL 
 
14,611 
 
18,85 
 
68,7222 
 
52,918 
 
16,7016*** 
 
0 
 
* p < 0,05 
*** p < 0,001 
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SIGNIFICANT DIFERENCES 
 
NON-SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES 
 
01. Problem definition (*) 
04. Contribution to discussion (***) 
05. Reasoning opinions and decisions (**) 
06. Formulating conclusions (*) 
07. Formulating hypotheses (*) 
08. Pointing out absurdities and contradictions (***) 
12. Planning action (**) 
13. Applying contribution to new situations (*) 
14. Centring on processes and strategies (*) 
16. Maintaining attention (***) 
17. Critical and unconforming attitude (**) 
20. Demanding more information (**) 
21. Precision of information (**) 
23. Considering points of view of others (**) 
 
 
02. Analysing reality 
03. Simplifying situations 
09. Returning to prior topics 
10. Exploring other alternatives 
11. Non impulsive behaviour 
18. Self-referring conclusions 
19. Formulating general rules 
22. Inclusion in general reference 
systems 
*p<0.05 
** p<0.01 
***p<0.001 
 
Table 6.- Differences between moments 1 and 2 on each improved cognition indicator. 
 
